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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
RUDY DOMINGUEZ, 
Defendant-Appellant. case No. 14703 
APPELIANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal case wherei~ the appellant appeals 
from a conviction of aggravated assault. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter came before the Honorable Edward Sbeya: 
Judge of the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Ca~n 
).'. ~ 
County, for trial, sitting with a jury, on June 22, 1976. ·-on 
June 23, 1976, after closing arguments, the jury retired to 
deliberate and returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty 
of aggravated assault. Stand-by counsel for defendant requested 
a pre-sentence report and the matter was set for sentencing 
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on July 12, 1976, at which time the court sentenced defendant 
to a term of not to exceed five years at the State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction 
because (1) The trial court denied appellant's constitutional 
right to a fair trial wheri it permitted appellant to represent 
himself, because he had insufficient time to prepare his de-
fense and also because he was not mentally competent; and (2) 
The trial court committed reversible error by failing to pro-
perly instruct the jury on the defense of insanity. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During the evening of February 29, 1976, appellant 
and Joe Albert Valdez were at the No Name Bar, previously 
known as the White Star, drinking beer with their respective 
friends (Tr. 6). Appellant and Valdez got into a verbal 
argument, Valdez struck appellant, and a fight ensued with 
Valdez knocking appellant to the ground (Tr. 7, 13): but 
friends soon stopped the fight (Tr. 17). Shortly thereafter 
Valdez left the bar (Tr. 7), and minutes later appellant also 
left the bar (Tr. 17). Appoximately 45 minutes later Valdez 
returned to the bar (Tr. 8). Shortly thereafter appellant 
also return~d, entering through a doorway with a knife in 
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his hand and walking over to Valdez and swinging once at him 
with the knife, cutting him under tne right eye (Tr. 8, 18). 
On March 18, 1976, appellant appeared before the 
Price City Court for arraignment and counsel on appeal was 
appointed as appellant's defense counsel (R 2). On April 5, 
1976, appellant appeared before the District court for 
arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty (District court 
Minute Entries). On April 15, 1976, appellant's counsel 
filed with the District court a Notice that appellant in-
tended to assert the defense of insanity at his trial (R 11). 
The court, on May 10, 1976, appointed two alienists to examine 
appellant and investigage into his sanity, and on June 2, 
1976, the court vacated its May 10 order appointing: alienist 
and appointed two other alienists (R 12, 13) • On June 21, 
1976, the day before trial, appellant requested the court 
to release his court appointed counsel and allow appellant 
to represent himself at trial without the assistance of 
counsel. The trial court granted appellant's request, ordering 
the release of his legal counsel and permitting appellant to 
represent himself as attorney pro se and further ordering that 
the same legal counsel act as appellant's Stand-By counsel 
at the trial (District court Minute Entries). On June 22, 
1976, the day of the trial, the court conducted a special hear-
ing, advising appellant as to the procedures to be followed_ 
. i 
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in representing himself at the trial and ordering that the 
Court was satisfied that the defendant voluntarily waived 
his right to legal counsel and that appellant could represent 
himself at the trial and further ordering that appellant's 
previously appointed legal counsel be appointed as stand-By 
counsel to be present at the counsel table with appellant 
(District court Minute Entries) • 
At the conclusion of the special hearing appellant's 
trial commenced. Appellant, acting as attorney pro se, con-
ducted all of the cross-examination of the State's eight 
witnesses. During the presentation of the State's case, 
appellant's Stand-By counsel occasionally made, on behalf 
of appellant, objections to the introduction of certain 
evidence, and on other occasions requested of the court that 
he be allowed to confer with appellant before appellant con-
tinued with his cross-examination of the State's witnesses 
(Tr. 5, 9, 12, 14, 15, 24, 28, 30, 37, 39, 42, 47, 75, 77). 
At the conclusion of the State's case, appellant presented 
his case, consisting of one witness--one of the two Court 
appointed alienists. Inunediately prior to direct examination 
of his sole witness appellant made the court and Stand-By 
counsel aware of the fact that he could not read, and Stand-
By counsel therefore requested of the court that he be allowed 
to conduct the direct examination of the expert witness 
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(Tr. 57). After the State cross-examined, appellant con-
ducted re-direct examination. (Tr. 72). At the conclusion 
of the presentation of evidence, both appellant and his 
Stand-By counsel presented closing arguments to the jury 
(Tr. 88). After the jury retired for their deliberations, 
appellant's Stand-By counsel took exception to Jury In-
struction No. 4 pertaining to the defense of insanity (Tr. 88). 
The jury reached a verdict, finding the defendant guilty of 
aggravated assault (Tr. 88). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT DENIED APPELIAlff' S C~"" ·>.:~'i.' 
TUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL, AND OTHER-
WISE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROil, WHEN D' 
PERMITTED DEFENMNT TO REPRESENT HIMSELF 
AT HIS TRIAL, BECAUSE HE HAD I.:NSUFFlClEft·. · .-.. : -' 
TIME IN WHICH TO PREPARE HIS DEFENSE AND 
ALSO BECAUSE HE WAS NOT MENTALLY COMR'fEa. e.-u 
constitutionally, legislatively, and judiciall:Jl!f":.r':i 
Utah has recognized that a defendant in criminal prosecu-.. :.,,_.e_, 
tions has the right to ~epresent himself. constitution of 
Utah, Art. 1, Sec. 12; Utah code Annotated, 77-1-8 (l) 
(1953); state vs Penderville, infra. The United States Supreme 
Court has recently held the same right of self representation 
to be applicable through the 14th Ammendment to those States 
which have not passed a constitutional amendment or statute 
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giving a defendant a right of self representation. Faretta 
vs California, infra. However, in order to afford the 
criminal defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial, 
the judiciary has qualified the defendant's constitutional 
right of self representation by requiring that the criminal 
defendant desiring to represent himself be sui juris and 
not·mentally incompetent. The Utah Supreme court made such 
a qualification in State vs Penderville, 2 U. 2d 281, 272 P. 
2d 195 (1954). Therein, defendant Penderville appealed his 
conviction of murder in the second degree on the ground, ~ 
~. that the trial court committed reversible error in 
refusing to permit the defendant to conduct his own defense. 
The court agreed with the defendant,_ holding that .the trial 
court erred in denying defendant his right to try his case 
without the aid of counsel. However, during the course of 
the opinion the court qualified a criminal defendant's right 
under Article 1 Section 12 of the Utah constitution to con-
duct his own defense: 
It is generally, if not universally held that 
the accused in a criminal proceeding who is 
sui juris and not mentally incompetent has 
the right to conduct his own defense without 
the aid of counsel. 272 P. 2d at 199. 
(emphasis added) 
The United states Supreme court in Faretta vs California, 422 
u. s. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 s. ct. 2525 (1975), made the 
same qualification to its holding that a criminal defendant 
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in state cases has a 6th and 14th ammendment right to conduct 
his own defense without the assistance of counsel: 
When an accused manages his own defense he 
relinquishes, as a purely factual matte~, 
many of the traditional benefits associated 
with the right to counsel. For this reason, 
in order to represent himself, the accused 
must knowingly and intelligently forego those 
relinquished benefits. Although a defendant 
need not himself have the skill and experience 
of a lawyer in order competently and intelli-
gently to choose self representation, he should 
be made aware of the dangers and disadvan-
tages of self representation, so that the 
record will establish that "he knows what he 
is doing and his choice is made with eyes 
open". Here, weeks before trial, Faretta 
- clearly and unequivocally declared to.the trial 
Judge that he wanted to represent himself 
and did not want counsel. The record affirm-
atively shows that Faretta was literate, ocna-
petent, and understanding, and.that he was 
voluntarily exercising his informed f;r;ee wi.1.'L.t 
45 L. Ed. 2d at 581-582. 
Reference is also made to 21 Am. Jur. 2d,. CRIMINAL IAW, Section 
310 at 335: 
' .. 
Thus, if he is sui juris and mentally competent, 
an accused may conduct his defense in pe.-s~ 
without the assistance of counsel, where he 
elects to do so in full knowledge and undex-
standing of the risks involved. 
In the instant case it is appellant's contention 
that the lower court denied his constitutional right to a 
fair trial and otherwise committed reversible error by granting 
his request to release his court appointed legal counsel and 
to allow him to conduct his own defense at trial. Appellant 
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grounds his contention on the following three facts: 
1. Appellant's request to act as attorney pro se, 
and the court's Order of the same, were made only one day 
prior to the trial and therefore didn't give appellant suf-
ficient time in which to prepare his defense. As disclosed 
by the District Court's Minute Entries contained in the record 
on appeal, appellant requested of the court on June 21, 1976, 
that he be allowed to represent himself at his trial and that 
his court appointed legal counsel be released from further 
representation. On that same day the District court ordered 
that appellant be allowed to conduct his own defense and that 
his court appointed legal counsel be released but that he 
act as Stand-By counsel at the trial and sit at the counsel 
table with appellant to advise him on matters as the trial 
proceeded. Appellant's trial began the following day (Tr. 
Title Page, District court Minute Entries). Therefore, at 
best appellant had 24 hours in which to prepare for his trial. 
Such a short time period would be entirely insufficient for 
the best of legal counsel, let alone one such as appellant 
who is not schooled in the law. Although not directly on 
point, Utah code Annotated, Section 77-24-18 (1953) requires 
that defendant be allowed at least two days to prepare for 
trial after making his plea. Also, compare the criminal 
defendant's time situation in Faretta vs California, supra, 
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with that of appellant's: 
Here, weeks before trial, Faretta clearly and 
unequivocally declared to the trial Judge that 
he wanted to represent himself and did not 
want counsel. 45 L. Ed. 2d at 582. (emphasis 
added) • 
2. Appellant was partially illiterate in that he 
could not read and therefore was not mentally competent to 
prepare and conduct his own defense. Even assuming that 
appellant could adequately prepare for trial within a 24 hour 
period, to do so would require that appellant have the abilit_y 
to read over the pleadings and research out statutory pr~_ 
visions and judicial opinions. 
possess the ability to read. 
. -: ,., .. 
However, appellant did not -~ 
.;o, .~ .. ~~ l ·~t..!f"'4"' 
The trial court and Stand-ey counsel 
. '·. '. .•. '. -:.:t 
were first made aware at a very late stage of the trial.pro-
ceeding that defendant could not read and therefore could 
t: l t19 
not conduct the direct examination of his expert witness I'-,-~•· ,!~b 
(Tr. 57). It re-quires little imagination for one to conclude 
' ·.·, ,,, .. ,-3 :ton 
that without the ability to read, appellant coul~ not effect-·~!~! 
ively prepare to meet the State's charge that he c~it~!~~ 
the offense of aggravated assault, or effectively pre~e ,, ,Qla~ 
his defense of insanity. Again, compare defendant's_s1tuat~an 
.• ' ,.~ .... :J 
in Faretta vs California, supra, where the trial court de-
termined, prior to trial, that Faretta was literate: 
The record shows that Faretta was lite£ate, 
competent, and understanding, and that1\e 
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was voluntarily exercising his informed free 
will. ,!£. 
3. Within the prescribed statutory p~riod after 
district court arraignment and long before appellant requested 
that he be allowed to represent himself, appellant entered 
the defense of insanity. On April 5, 1976, appellant appeared 
before the district court for arraignment and entered a plea 
of not guilty (District court Minute Entries) • On April 15, 
1976, appellant gave notice that he was intending to assert 
the defense of insanity at his trial (R 11). On June 21, 
1976, appellant requested of the Court, and the Court granted 
his request, to represent himself at trial. On June 22nd 
trial began (District court Minute Entries). 
counsel is well aware that when a criminal defendant 
enters the defense of insanity that defense puts in issue the 
defendant's sanity at the time of the proscribed conduct, 
not the defendant's sanity at the time of psychiatric exam-
ination or at the time of trial. Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 
76-2-305 (1953 as amended): State vs Gleason, 17 u. 2d 150, 405 
P. 2d 793 (1965). Appellant in the instant case does not 
contend otherwise. Rather, appellant contends first that by 
virtue of the trial court permitting the appellant to con-
duct his own defense at trial appellant's defense of insanity 
lost its credibility in the eyes of the jury. Stated otherwise, 
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a juror's reaction might very well be to conclude that for 
the trial judge to permit appellant to represent himself at 
trial implies that the trial judge is of the opinion that 
appellant has full control of his mental faculties and is 
legally sane, and therefore appellant's defense that he is 
not guilty by reason of insanity is entirely without merit. 
Again, counsel recognizes that a criminal defendant might 
very well be legally insane at the time he conunitted the 
offense but be in full control of his mental faculties and 
legally sane at the time of his trial. However, this begs 
the question as to whether jurors can draw the same distinction 
under these peculiar circumstances of a defendant who has 
entered a defense of insanity, yet who has been permitted to 
conduct his own defense. 
Second, to be denied the contitUtional right to 
represent hi.11.Self, a criminal defendant need not be proved 
legally insane; rather, it need only be established that he 
is mentally incompetent. Yet, the connection between possible 
legal insanity at the time of the proscribed conduct and mental 
incompetency at the time of trial comes because the defense 
of insanity contains overtones that the criminal defendant 
is mentally ill or incompetent, although not to the point of 
insanity, at the time of trial. Such was the reasoning of 
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the federal district court for Tennessee in United states vs 
~ 260 F. Supp. 1009 (E. D. Tenn. 1966). Therein, defen-
dant Davis moved for a new trial after a conviction of kid-
napping, on the ground, inter alia, that the court erred in 
refusing defendant's request to conduct his own defense un-
assisted by legal counsel. The court disagreed with the 
defendant, holding that defendant was not mentally competent 
to conduct his own defense: 
In this case, defendant is a college graduate, 
having a bachelors degree from the University 
of Chattanooga, with a major in Business Ad-
ministration. He has an agile mind, and is 
articulate. However, prior to the trial, and 
at the time of the trial, there was considerable , 
evidence that defendant was at least emotionally 
disturbed. • • • It was generally agreed that 
defendant's disturbance took the form of schiz-
ophrenic reaction, paranoid type, manifested 
by inappropriate thinking, grandiose delusions, 
etc •••• An important factor in capacity to 
be tried is the defendant's mental ability 
to render his counsel such assistance to make 
possible a proper defense •••• On the other 
hand, it is vital to defense pro se, that one 
be able to recognize proper defenses and 
evidence to support them and to be able to 
discard the irrelevant. The distinction 
between capacity to stand trial and capacity 
to defend pro se has been recognized by the 
supreme Court. In the case of Massey vs 
Moore 384 u. s. 105, 75 s. ct. 145, 99 L. Ed. 
"ffi(l954), the court held: "One might not 
be insane in the sense of being incapable of 
standing trial and yet lack the capacity to 
stand trial without benefit of counsel." 
Further the defense in the instant case was 
that of 1 temporary insanity. There was little 
if any dispute as to the acts constituting 
the offenses with which defendant was charged. 
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Alt~ough defendan~'s plea was temporary in-
sanity, such a derense has overtones of mental 
illness which mig:1t carry into the time of 
trial. It is appropriate to note the remark 
of Justice Douglas in Massey vs Moore, supra, 
that: "If he is insane, his need of a lawyer 
to tender the defense is too plain for argu-
ment," though that case was concerned with 
allegations of insanity at the time of trial. 
The court is of the opinion that defendant, 
although having the capacity to stand trial, 
was not capable of representing himself and 
conducting his own defense. 260 F. Supp. at 
1020 and 1021. 
Although appellant is arguing the reverse, i. e. 
that he should not have been allowed to represent himself, 
the end result should be the same: Appellant shouldn't have 
been able to represent himself because he asserted the de-
fense of insanity and the assertion of such a defense and 
presentation of evidence at trial to that effect sufficient 
to overcome the presumption of sanity has overtones that 
appellant suffered from mental illness at the time of trial 
and that such mental illness, even if falling short of leqal 
insanity at the time of trial, would still constitute mental 
incompetence. As in United States vs Davis, supra, evidence 
was presented at trial in the instant case regarding mental 
illness defendant suffered from at the time of trial. On 
appellant's redirect examination of Dr. Chicadus, appellant's 
sole defense witness, the following colloquy took place be-
tween himself and Dr. Chicadus (Tr. 73): 
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Q. Yes Sir. Would you call it a mental disease 
that I have? 
A. A mental illness, yes. 
Q. I do have a mental illness in your opinion? 
A. In my opinion. 
Q. Was this, a lack of education? 
A. No. 
Q. Would you classify it as lacking commun-
ication with society? 
A. Not really. 
Q. How would you classify it? 
A. Well, it has to do with the responses that 
you gave in the mental status examination. 
And it is to do with the ability to abstract. 
To be able to coqnizant of things. To give 
reality. To respond to factual questions. 
Lacking the ability to perceive reality and to be coqnizant of 
his surroundings, the question must be asked seriously whether 
appellant was mentally competent to conduct his own defense at 
trial. 
POINT 2 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERS IBLE ERROR BY 
FAILING TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE 
DEFENSE OF INSANITY. 
At appellant's trial, the lower court gave the fol-
lowing jury instruction, titled Instruction No. 4 (R 22, 23): 
I instruct you that the issue of whether the 
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Defendant was sane or insane at the time he 
is alleged to have committed the offense 
charged in the Information has been raised by 
the evidence in this case. Whether one is 
sane or insane at said time is a question of 
fact for you to determine. 
Insanity is an element in determining questions 
of guilt of or punishment for crime only when 
it renders the person so affected irresponsible 
or partly irresponsible. That is, the Defendant 
cannot be convicted of the crime charged, if, 
at the time of the act, he was insane to such 
an extent that he did not know the nature of 
the act; that is, did not know he had a knife, 
or that if he used it on Joe Albert Valdez, 
it may injure Mr. Valdez: or that, when he 
wielded the knife against the"person of Mr. 
Valdez, he did not know it was wrong in the 
sense that such act was condemned by mm.tale u 
law; or that he was unable, by reason of mental 
disease, to control his actions or impulses 
to injure Joe Albert Valdez. 
If you find from all of the evidence in this 
case beyond a reasonable doubt that the ne-: " 
fendant cut Joe Albert Valdez with a knife, 
and that said knife was a deadly weapen,,, &ml"' 
if you further find that at the time of this 
act that Defendant knew the nature of the aicS 
and knew that wielding a knife and striking Mr. 
Valdez with the same may injure Mr. Valdes* y 
and if you further find that Defendant knew 
it was wrong to wield said knife in the sense 
that such act was condemned by morals or liar 
and that at said time he was not suffering fraa 
mental disease and could have controlled b.is'· · · 
actions or impulses to injure Mr. Valdez, tAen 
you should find the Defendant guilty as charged 
in the Information. 
on the other hand, if you find from all of t:Ae 
evidence in this case that the Defendant at 
the time of wielding said knife and cutting 
Mr. Valdez, he was insane to such an extent 
that he did not know the nature of the act: 
.... 
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that is, did not know he had a knife or that 
if he wielded it and struck Mr. Valdez with it 
it may injure Mr. Valdez; or that when he ' 
struck Mr. Valdez with the knife he did not 
kn0\>1 it was wrong in the sense that such act 
was condemned by morals or law; or that he was 
unable, by reason of mental disease, to control 
his actions or impulses to injure Mr. Valdez 
or if you entertain a reasonable doubt as to' 
Defendant's insanity in doing the acts l1ereto-
fore particularly mentioned, then you shall 
find the Defendant not guilty by reason of 
insanity. 
You are further instructed that the terms 
"mental disease" or "insanity" do not include 
an abnormality manifested only by repeated 
criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. 
After the jury retired for deliberation, appellant's Stand-
By counsel excepted to the above jury instruction (Tr~ SS) on 
the ground that it did not accurately reflect the definition 
and defense of insanity as set forth in Utah code Annotated, 
Section 76-2-305 (1953 as amended): 
(l) In any prosecution for an offense, it shall 
be a defense that the defendant, at the time 
of the proscribed conduct, as a result of mental 
disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity 
either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law. 
(2) As used in this section, the terms mental 
disease or defect do not include an abnormality 
manifested only by repeated criminal or other-
wise antisocial conduct. 
On appeal here, it is appellant's contention that the above 
quoted jury instruction used by the lower court at his trial 
is taken from Utah supreme court opinions prior in time to 
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the State Legislature's adoption of Section 76-2-305, supra1 
that Section 76-2-305 sets forth a legal test of insanity 
different from that contained in the trial court's jury instruc-
tion and the Utah Supreme Court opinions from which it came1 
that Section 76-2-305 supersedes and overrules the judicial 
opinions prior in time to it, and consequently the jury at 
appellant's trial was not instructed on the proper and ap-
plicable Utah law relating to the defense of insanity1 and 
therefore the trial Court committed reversible error. 
Such contentions necessitate review of the Utah 
case law and comparison of it to Section 76-2-305. In ~ 
vs Hadley 234 P. 940 (Utah 1925), the Utah supreme court 
affirmed defendant Hadley's conviction of the offense of 
carnal knowledge, disagreeing with defendant that the trial 
court committed error in instructing the jury on the defense 
of insanity. During the course of the opinion, the court gave 
its approval to the trial court's jury instruction on insanity: 
The court further instructed the Jury that 
insanity or mental unsoundness must be of such 
degree as to leave the accused in such a 
mental state as to deprive hiln of the capacity 
to understand that the act conuuitted consti-
tuted an offense and was wrong. These in-
structions fairly defined the law governing 
the rights of the accused upon a defense based 
upon insanity or lack of mental ability. 234 
P. at 942. 
In State vs Green, 78 u. 580, 6 P. 2d 177 (1931)1 and 86 ·u. 
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192, 40 P. 2d 961 (1935), Utah's highest court again addressed 
the issue of the legal test for insanity. Therein, the court 
set forth the following as an accurate statement of the law 
to be incorporated into jury instructions: 
Assuming that the jury in this case found 
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant shot and killed James 
Green as charged in the Information, he would 
be entitled to an acquittal if at that time 
he was, as a matter of fact, insane to such 
an extent that he either (1) did not know the 
nature of his act, that is, did not know that 
he had a revolver, that it may be loaded, and 
that, if discharged at or towards James Green, 
it would probably injure or kill him; or (2) 
that when he fired the shot he did not know 
it was wrong in the sense that such act was 
condemned by morals or law; (3) that he was 
unable by reason of his mental disease to 
control his actions or impulses to injure or 
kill James Green. If the defendant was 
afflicted with a disease of the mind at the 
time of the alleged offense in any one or 
more of the three manners and to the extent 
indicated, then and in such case he was not 
legally responsible. 6 P. 2d at 184. 
A comparison of the above quoted lang~age with that used by 
the lower court in Jury Instruction No. 4, supra, in the in-
stant case will reveal that the lower court incorporated 
verbatim most of the language contained above into Instruction 
No. 4. 
The next case heard by the Utah Supreme court 
F 
regarding the defense of insanity was that of State vs Kirkham 
7 u. 2d 108, 319 P. 2d 859 (1958) and therein the court approved 
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the jury instruction set forth in State vs Green, supra, once 
again and noted that it constituted a combination of the 
McNaghten test and the irresistable impulse test. 319 P. 
2d at 861. The combination test set forth in State vs 
Green, supra, and reaffirmed in State vs Kirkham, supra, was 
the subject of attack in State vs Poulson, 14 u. 2d 213, 381 
P. 2d 93 (1963). Defendant Poulson appealed his conviction 
of murder in the first degree on the ground, inter alia, 
that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the 
defense of insanity under either the so called "Durham Rule 0 
or the American Law Institute's proposed rule, rather t'ban 
.~. 
~ W··>. 
the combination test set forth in State vs Green. 'l'he Supr._ ; 
court of Utah disagreed with the defendant, holding: 
' - ··$!1-
The Instruction, as given by the lower c~tt< ,r,1 
embodies both the McNaghten Rule and ~ sqr 'c 
called •irresistable impulse" test. Such an 
instruction adequately protected the inte~\11 
of the defendant, and we are not persuaded to 
adopt in lieu thereof either the Dm'• ~1@1 6 
or the rule proposed by the A. L. I." 381 P. 
2d at 95. · 
The court's reaffirmation in State vs Pgu1son of._t;Jae 
combination McNaghten-irresistable impulse tests initiall.J.·.·,: 
promulgated in State vs Green, supra, and the accompaJ:1.ying ,,_;, 
rejection of the American Law Institute's "substantial capacity'' 
test must now give way to Section 76-2-305, supra, which adapts 
the American Law Institute's test verbatim. The following 
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constitutes the American Law Institute's Rule on insanity 
as set forth in the Model Penal Code, Section 401, (1962 
Proposed Official Draft): 
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal 
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a 
result of mental disease or defect he lacks 
substant~al capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or 
to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law. 
(2) As used in this Article, the terms mental 
disease or defect do not include an abnormality 
manifested only by repeated criminal or other-
wise antisocial conduct. · 
Granted, the A. L. I. Rule as set forth in 76-2-305, 
supra, sets forth what appears to be a combination test of the 
McNaghten Rule and the irresistable impulse test; however, 
section 76-2-305 goes one step further and is much broader in 
statement and concept in that it only requires a lack of 
"substantial capacity". .In contrast, both the McNaghten Rule 
and the irresistable impulse test require the complete lack 
of capacity. In addition, the A. L. I. Rule and Section 
76-2-305 are broader in scope and definition as to what 
constitutes insanity in that it only requires defendant to 
lack substantial capacity to "appreciate" the wrongfulness 
of his conduct, whereas the McNaghten Rule requires defendant 
to lack complete ability to "know" his conduct is wrong. A 
well drafted statement of the difference between the A. L. I. 
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test and the McNaghten and irresistable impulse tests is set 
fort!l in CRIMINAL LAW, Wayne R. LaFave and Austin w. Scott, 
Jr., West Publishing Co., Hornbook Series, 1972, Section 38 
at 293: 
Most significant is the fact that the A. L. I. 
test only requires a lack of "substantial 
capacity". This is clearly a departure from 
the usual interpretation of McNaghten and 
irresistable impulse, whereby a complete im-
pairment of cognitive capacity and capacity 
for self-control is necessary. Substantial 
capacity, the draftsmen noted, is all "that 
candid witnesses, called on to infer the 
nature of the situation at a time that they 
did not observe, can ever confidently say, 
even when they know that a disorder was extreme." 
Moreover, even if witnesses could be more 
specific, it is undoubtedly true that there are 
many cases of advanced mental disorder in which 
rudimentary capacities of cognition and volition 
exist but which clearly present inappropriate 
occasions for the application of criminal sanc-
tions. The draftsmen acknowledged that the word 
"substantial" imputes no specific measure of 
degree, but concluded that identifying the 
degree of impairment with precision was "im-
possible both verbally and logically." 
The A. L. I. test uses the word "appreciate" 
instead of "know," a term which has been re-
sponsible for much of the criticism and mis-
understanding of McNaghten. It thus seems 
apparent that expert testimony concerning the 
emotional or affective aspects of the defen-
dant's personality is clearly relevant on this 
aspect of the A. L. I. formulation. As to the 
"conform" part of the test, it avoids the 
implication (often drawn from the irresistible 
impulse test) that the loss of volitional 
capacity can be reflected only in 
sudden or spontaneous acts as distinguished . 
from those accompanied by brooding or reflection. 
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As a comparison of the McNaghten-irresistible 
impulse tests and the A. L. !.-Section 76-2-305 test reveals, 
they differ markedly from one another. Therefore, failure 
on the part of the trial court to include in its Jury Instruc-
tion No. 4 the language set forth in Section 76-2-305 (1) 
prevented the jury from applying the correct Utah law on the 
defense of, insanity, as adopted by the Utah State Legislature, 
to the facts of the case as presented through testimony at 
trial. This constitutes reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant was denied his constitutional right 
to a fair trial, and the trial court otherwise committed 
reversible error, when it permitted appellant to represent 
himself at trial, because he did not have sufficient time 
in which to prepare for trial,. and because he was not mentally 
competent to conduct his own defense in view of his illiter-
acy, his mental illness at the time of trial, and his asser-
tion of the defense of insanity. 
The trial court also committed error because it 
failed to properly instruct the jury on the defense of in-
sanity in that the court's jury instruction contained the 
combination McNaghten-irresistable impulse rules as set forth 
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in State vs Green rather than instructing on the defense of 
insanity as set forth in 76-2-305. 
Therefore, the appellant's conviction and sentence 
by the lower court should be reversed. 
MTED this JP./ if day of October, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MICHAEL R. JENSEN 
Frandsen and Keller 
Professional Building 
90 West First North 
Price, Utah 84501 
Attorneys for Appellant 
By::tJ;}~d r· R. NSEN 
CERTIFJ:CATE OF SERVICE 
J: hereby certify that the foregoing Appellant's 
Brief was served on counsel for the respondent, Vernon B. 
Romney, Utah State Attorney General, by delivering three (3) 
copies thereof to his office at 236 State capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
1976. 
84114 on the.~~~-day of October, 
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